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Abstract
Competition among physicians is widespread, but compelling empirical evidence on the
impact on service provision is limited, mainly due to lack of exogenous variation in the degree
of competition. In this paper we exploit that many GPs, in addition to own practice, work
in local emergency centres, where the matching of patients to GPs is random. This allows us
to observe the same GP in two di¤erent competitive environments; with competition (own
practice) and without competition (emergency centre). Using rich administrative patient-
level data from Norway for 2006-14, which allow us to estimate high-dimensional xed-e¤ect
models to control for time-invariant patient and GP heterogeneity, we nd that GPs with a
fee-for-service (xed salary) contract are 11 (8) percentage points more likely to certify sick
leave at own practice than at the emergency centre. Thus, competition has a positive impact
on GPssick listing that is reinforced by nancial incentives.
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1 Introduction
Competition among physicians is widespread. Almost every country has a market-based alloca-
tion of physician services, though the scope for competition may vary according to government
regulations. In particular, the extent to which prices of physician services are set administra-
tively or determined in the market di¤ers across public and private health care systems. In this
paper we study the e¤ect of non-price competition among physicians on their service provision in
a National Health Service (NHS), and how this relationship depends on the nancial incentives
provided by the physiciansremuneration schemes.
Despite the widespread presence of competition in physician markets, the empirical evidence
on its impact on physiciansservice provision is surprisingly scarce.1 There are only a few papers,
which we discuss below, that provide compelling evidence on the causal relationship between
competition and physician behaviour. A main reason for this is that market structure is endoge-
nous, which makes it hard to obtain plausible exogenous variation in the degree of competition.
A standard regression analysis of market concentration on physiciansservice provision, as used
by most of the existing literature on physician markets, will yield biased estimates. While in-
strumental variable approaches could be employed to deal with the endogeneity problem, the
lack of data in physician markets has made this di¢ cult.2
In this paper we propose a novel approach to identify the impact of competition on physicians
service provision. More precisely, we take advantage of the fact that many General Practitioners
(GPs), in addition to their regular o¢ ce practice, work in local primary care emergency centres
(PCECs). At the PCECs, the physician-patient matching is random, implying that the GPs face
exogenous demand and thus no competition for patients. However, at the GPsown practice,
the matching is a result of patient choice and the GPs should realise that their treatment
decisions will a¤ect both the probability that the patient chooses to remain on the GPslist in
the future, and also, through reputation e¤ects, the probability that new patients will choose to
be listed with the GP. Since the data allows us to observe the same GP in di¤erent competitive
environments, being exposed (in own practice) or not (in emergency centre) to competition, we
are in principle able to isolate the e¤ect on competition on GP behaviour in a way that allows
1See the review by Gaynor and Town (2011).
2For more details, see Gaynor and Town (2011).
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us to make causal inferences.
A key issue, though, is to control for other factors (than competition) that may inuence
physician behaviour in the two competitive environments. To do so, we exploit rich adminis-
trative data with detailed patient-level information in Norway from 2006 to 2014. From these
data, which basically cover the whole population in Norway, we select the ten most frequent
acute diagnoses treated by GPs. As outcome variable, we use certication of (paid) sick leave,
which is a highly frequent and standardised treatment choicemade by GPs for acute diagnoses.
The detailed data allow us to estimate high-dimensional xed-e¤ect models using only within
patient and GP variation. This implies that we control for all time-invariant unobserved (and
observed) patient and GP heterogeneity. We also include diagnosis xed-e¤ects and control for
time trend, as well as a wide set of potentially time-varying patient and GP characteristics.
Our key nding is that GPs are more likely to issue sick leave to patients that visit them
at their own practice than at the emergency centre. We also nd that GPs with an activity-
based (fee-for-service and capitation) contract are more likely to o¤er sick leave than GPs with
a xed-salary contract. These results are economically signicant. In our most preferred model,
GPs with an activity-based contract are 11 percentage points more likely to o¤er a sick leave
at their own practice than at the emergency centre, whereas the same gure for GPs on xed-
salary contracts are 8 percentage points. These nding are (in qualitative terms) highly robust
across a large set of specications and sensitivity tests. We therefore conclude that competition
does inuence physician behaviour, and that this e¤ect is reinforced by nancial incentives (i.e.,
activity-based remuneration of physician services).
To develop economic intuition for the results, we construct a dynamic model of GPschoices
of sick-listing practice styles when patients di¤er in illness severity and thus the need for a sick
leave. In the model patients always (weakly) prefer a sick leave certicate irrespective of illness
severity, as it is optional to make use of it. This implies that, under competition, GPs can
increase future demand by adopting a more lenient sick-listing practice style. Assuming GPs are
semi-altruistic and that deviating from medical sick-listing guidelines (i.e., being too lenient) is
costly for the GP, we show that the e¤ect of exposing GPs to competition crucially depends on
the GPsremuneration scheme. For GPs with an activity-based (fee-for-service or capitation)
contract, competition always induces the GPs to be more lenient in terms of sick listing. For GPs
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with a xed-salary contract, the e¤ect of competition is a priori ambiguous. If GPs are mainly
prot motivated, competition induces the GPs to adopt a stricter practice style in order to avoid
(rather than attract) patients. However, the reverse is true if GPs are su¢ ciently altruistic and
thus put a larger weight on patientsbenet from obtaining a sick leave relative to the costs of
being too lenient.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we review the relevant
literature. In Section 3 we present the Norwegian primary care market. In Section 4 we develop
a dynamic model for GPssick listing practice and derive predictions for the empirical analysis.
In Section 5 we present our data and provide some descriptive statistics. In Section 6 we explain
our empirical strategy and in Section 7 the empirical results. In Section 8 we conduct several
sensitivity tests. Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Related literature
The economic literature on the market for physician services is extensive. A majority of work
is on physician agencythat focuses on the role of asymmetric information in the relationship
between patients and physicians and physician-induced demand.3 There is also a large and
related literature on physician incentives and payment schemes that studies the e¤ects of fee
changes on physicianssupply of medical services.4 However, the literature on competition per
se in physician markets is surprisingly sparse despite its widespread presence.5
There exists an early literature on the e¤ects of competition on pricing of physician services.
Most of this literature tends to use the number of physicians per capita within a geographic area
as measure of competition, and exploit across-area variation to estimate the e¤ect of competition
on service prices.6 More recent papers use instead measures of market concentration, such
as the Herndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), to estimate the impact on service prices.7 A key
problem is that these measures of competition are endogenous and thus yield biased results. A
3See, for instance, the review by McGuire (2000) and the recent paper by Jacobson et al. (2013).
4See, for instance, the seminal work by Gruber and Owings (1996) and the more recent work by Devlin and
Sarma (2008), Clemens and Gottlieb (2014) and Brekke et al. (2016).
5For a review, see Gaynor and Town (2011).
6See, for instance, the seminal work by Pauly and Satterthwaite (1981) who use data on 92 US metropolitan
areas. They nd that areas with more physicians per capita have lower prices.
7See, for instance, Schneider et al. (2008) who nd that physician market concentration in California, measured
by HHI, is associated with higher prices.
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recent paper by Dunn and Shapiro (2014) deal with this problem by using predicted (rather
than actual) xed-travel-time HHI, as used by Kessler and McClellan (2000) for competition in
hospital markets. Linking these concentration measures to health insurance claims in the US,
they nd that physicians in more concentrated markets charge higher service prices. Another
paper is Gravelle et al. (2016) who study the impact of competition on consultation prices
charged by GPs in Australia. The degree of competition is measured by distance between GPs,
and they use within area (rather than across area) variation to identify the e¤ects of competition
on GPsconsultation prices. They argue that the areas are su¢ ciently small to account for the
fact that GPs locational decisions are endogenous. They nd that GPs with more distant
competitors charge higher prices and a smaller proportion of their patients make no out-of-
pocket payment. Our paper di¤ers from this strand of literature in that we focus on the impact
on non-price competition variables (i.e., sick listing) and take a di¤erent approach to obtain
exogenous variation in the degree of competition (i.e., within GP variation in competition and
service provision).
The number of studies on the impact of competition on physiciansservice provision is much
more limited than the above-mentioned literature on physician pricing. A recent paper by Santos
et al. (2016) provide evidence from the UK that patients respond to quality di¤erences among
GPs and are willing to travel further to higher quality practices. While this is not a direct test
of the e¤ects of competition, the study shows that GPs face higher demand if they improve
their quality. There are a few papers that use shortage of patientsas competition measure,
where shortage of patients is dened by whether the GP has open vacancies on their patient
lists. The idea is simply that patients with closed list are competing less intense than those
with open lists. For instance, Iversen and Lurås (2000) and Iversen (2004) show that Norwegian
GPs who experience shortage of patients provide more services and thus obtain higher income
per patient than their unconstrained colleagues (with full patient lists). A similar approach is
taken by Iversen and Ma (2011) who nd that more intense competition, measured either by
whether the GPspatient list is open or by the GPsdesired list size, leads to more diagnostic
radiology referrals. Finally, Godager et al. (2015a) nd that increased competition, measured
either by the number of open primary physician practices or HHI, has negligible or small positive
e¤ects on referrals overall. Although it might seem plausible that GPs compete less aggressively
5
in local markets with few open lists, the competition measure is clearly endogenous and thus
likely to su¤er from the same endogeneity problem as the use of market concentration measures,
such as the HHI. Our paper di¤ers from this strand of literature in that we do not consider
the relationship between primary and secondary care and the gatekeeping role of GPs.8 More
importantly, we propose a di¤erent approach to identifying the e¤ect of competition on GPs
service provision, i.e., within GP variation rather than across GP or local market variation.
Finally, we should mention a closely related study by Markussen and Røed (2016). They
study, as we do, the GPs propensity to issue sickness certication to patients using Norwegian
administrative data. Their study consists of three separate parts. First, they identify each GPs
degree of gatekeeper leniency at each point in time by using worker (patient) xed e¤ects,
which is identied by worker movements between GPs and between sick leave and work. Second,
they examine the extent to which workers choose GPs that are more lenient by estimating a
conditional logit model, where the choice set is identied by the observed GP choices among
other workers in the same local area. Third, they examine whether GPs adjust their gatekeeper
leniency in response to uctuations in demand or in costs of losing patients. This is done using a
xed e¤ect models where the e¤ects are identied on the basis of changes in the local competitive
environment or in the GPs remuneration structure. Their results show that patients tend to
choose GPs that have a more lenient sick-listing practice and GPs tend to become more lenient
in local markets with stronger competition. While this study reports similar results as we do,
they use conventional measures of competition, such as the number or share of GPs with open
lists (vacancies), the number of GPs per capita in an area, or the share of patients with a recent
GP switch. Our contribution is to propose a di¤erent approach to identify the causal impact of
competition by exploiting within GP variation in competition and sick listing.
3 Institutional background
In the Norwegian National Health Service (NHS), primary care provision is the responsibility
of the municipalities, although funding and regulation are to a large extent made by the central
government. Since the implementation of the Regular General Practitioner Scheme (Fastlegere-
8Besides the above-mentioned studies, there are several papers that adress the role of GPs as gatekeepers for
specialist care; see, for instance, Dusheiko et al. (2006), Brekke et al. (2007), and Gonzalez (2010).
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formen in Norwegian) in 2001, each inhabitant of Norway has the right to be listed with a GP.9
Patients are free to choose their GP (if the GP has vacant patient slots), and can switch GP
(without stating any particular reason) at most twice per year.10 In contrast, the GPs are not
allowed to select their patients. GPs are free to choose their patient list size in the interval
between 500 and 2500 patients (average list size is around 1200 patients). About 95% of GPs
are self-employed, private physicians contracting with municipalities, with the remaining GPs
being directly employed by the municipalities. The payment system for self-employed GPs is
a combination of a capitation fee (covered by the municipalities) and fee-for-service (covered
partly by the public social security agency and partly by the patients), where the fee-for-service
part constitutes around 70% of the GPstotal income. On the other hand, GPs employed by
the municipality are paid a xed salary.
Municipalities are also responsible for the emergency primary health care for their inhabitants
(and visitors). These services are o¤ered either at a GPs o¢ ce or at PCECs, which often serve
several municipalities. During evenings, nights and weekends, all emergency contacts are directed
to these centres. In larger municipalities, PCECs also o¤er services at daytime. During ordinary
opening hours, all GPs are obliged to accept and assess patients in need of emergency care in
their own practice. In principle, when below the age of 60, GPs are also obliged to provide
emergency care at PCECs, though it is possible to apply for exemption based on health or social
reasons. In practice, more than 50% of the GPs work at PCECs.
Approximately half of the consultations taking place at PCECs are with a regular GP and
the rest are covered by locums and junior doctors from hospitals. When working in an emer-
gency centre during daytime or in the evenings, the vast majority of GPs are paid according to
the same fee-for-service schedule as the one used for contracted GPs in their regular practice
(Godager et al., 2015b). The PCECs are mainly visited by patients with infections, muscu-
loskeletal problems, injuries and other physical disorder, though approximately 5% is related
to mental health problems. Epidemiological research has found that, compared to many other
countries, primary care emergency services are frequently used in Norway, and often in relation
9 In the following, GPrefers to primary care doctors that are contracted or employed by the municipalities,
i.e., GPs within the NHS.
10When choosing a GP, patients are not restricted to GPs located in their own municipalities. In practice,
though, the share of patients listed with GPs outside their own municipalities is very low.
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to conditions that could just as well have been treated by the patients regular GP. The reason
for this pattern appears to be relatively poor access to the GP during daytime (Sandvik et al.,
2012). A key feature of the consultations taking place at the emergency centres is that patients
are randomly matched with doctors, which we exploit as an identication strategy in our empir-
ical analysis. The implications of this will be further discussed in Section 6, where we describe
our empirical strategy.
An important function that GPs are entrusted with is gatekeeping to the Norwegian sickness
benet system, in which workers are entitled to a 100% replacement rate up to a maximum
threshold (approximately e61,000 or $64,700) from the rst day of sick leave and until one year
for the same sickness spell. The rst 16 days of sick leave are paid by the employer, while sickness
benet beyond the rst 16 days is covered by the public social security agency. Self-certication
can be used for the rst three or eight days of an absence spell depending on employer. Beyond
that period, eligibility for sickness benet requires certication from a GP who must assess the
ability to work (full or part time) and make a decision about sickness certication based on
this evaluation. The Norwegian Health Directorate has issued sickness certication guidelines
in order to help standardise the certication practice across GPs.11 Sickness certicates can
be issued both at a regular GP practice and at a PCEC and the procedures for issuing such
certicates are identical in both cases.
4 A dynamic model of GP practice styles
In this section we develop a dynamic model of GPschoices of sick-listing practice styles, where
we make sure that the model is su¢ ciently rich to incorporate the key institutional details of
the Norwegian primary care market. The model is used to make theoretical predictions about
how competition is likely to a¤ect sick-listing rates, and how this relationship is likely to depend
on GP payment schemes.
Suppose that a total mass of 1 innitely lived workers are uniformly distributed on a line
segment L = [0; 1]. In every period t, each worker falls (temporarily) sick with illness severity
s, which is assumed to be perfectly negatively correlated with work ability, and which is drawn
11These guidelines are available at https://helsedirektoratet.no/retningslinjer/sykmelderveileder.
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(independently in each period) from a uniform distribution with support [0; 1]. Each time a
worker falls sick, he can visit a GP who, in addition to prescribing an appropriate treatment,
might issue a sickness certicate. We assume that a GP can correctly observe patientsillness
severity and will issue a sickness certicate if the severity is above a threshold level. More
specically, we assume that GP i issues a sickness certicate to every patient with severity
s  bsi :=  i, where  2 (0; 1) is the threshold level for issuing sickness certicates according
to o¢ cial guidelines and i =    bsi represents GP is departure from these guidelines. Thus,
i reects GP is chosen practice style for issuing sickness certicates, where a higher value of
i implies a more lenient practice style.
12 Excluding travelling costs associated with a GP visit,
the utility of a patient with severity s who attends a GP is a (s) if he does not obtain a sickness
certicate and b (s) if he a obtains such a certicate, where a0 (s) < 0, b0 (s) < 0 and b (s) > a (s)
for all s. Thus, higher illness severity implies lower patient utility, but, for a given severity level,
a patient always prefers to get a sickness certicate.13
Suppose there are two GPs in the market, one located at each endpoint of L. Including
travelling costs, expected utility for a worker located at z and visiting GP i, located at zi, is14
U i (z) =
Z bsi
0
a (s) ds+
Z 1
bsi b (s) ds   jz   zij ; (1)
where  > 0 is the marginal travelling cost. With little loss of generality, we parameterise the
sub-utility functions as follows: a (s) =  s and b (s) = 1 s, where  2 (0; 1). Expected utility
in (1) is then given by
U i (z) =
1
2
  (1  ) bsi    jz   zij : (2)
We assume that the parameters ,  and  are such that U i (z) > 0 for all z and i, which
implies full market coverage; i.e., that every worker who falls sick always prefers to visit a GP.15
12A sickness certicate is valid for a certain period of time, which is decided by the GP. However, we abstract
from this dimension of the certication decision and consider only the decision of whether or not to issue a sickness
certicate.
13 If a sick worker prefers to work, he can always refrain from using the sickness certicate. Thus, a worker who
has already visited a GP can never be worse o¤ by obtaining a sickness certicate.
14For simplicity, we assume that patient co-payments are zero. Positive patient copayments would not a¤ect
the analysis in any way, as long as these copayments are exogenous and equal for both GPs in the market.
15This requires  < 1
2
   (1  ) and  < 1
2(1 ) .
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Suppose that, at each point on the line, a share  of workers can choose which GP to attend,
whereas each of the remaining share 1    is randomly allocated to one of the GPs each time
they fall sick. If all workers are able to correctly observe the practice style of each GP, the
worker who is indi¤erent between GP i and GP j is located at
bx = 1
2
+
(1  )  i   j
2
: (3)
This implies further that the potential demand for GP i from the segment of patients who make
a choice of GP is given by bx. However, since practice style is di¢ cult to observe ex ante,
it is unrealistic to assume that a GP who chooses a particular practice style will immediately
realise his potential demand. We assume instead that patientsbeliefs about the practice styles
of the two GPs evolve sluggishly over time through repeated interactions and reputation. More
specically, we assume that, at each point in time, only a fraction  2 (0; 1) of patients become
aware of changes in GP practice styles. This implies that only a fraction  of any potential
change in demand is realised at each point in time. Let actual demand of GP i at time t be
given by
Qi (t) =
1  
2
+ x (t) (4)
whereas potential demand is given by
bQi (t) = 1  
2
+ bx (t) ; (5)
where bx is given by (3). Analytically, the law of motion of actual demand is given by
dQi (t)
dt
:=

Qi (t) = 
 bQi (t) Qi (t) ; (6)
which is equivalent to
dx (t)
dt
:=

xi (t) =  (bx (t)  x (t)) : (7)
Suppose that the net income of GP i at time t is
i (t) = w + (1  ) pQi (t)  cQi (t) ; (8)
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where the GPs gross income is a linear combination of xed-salary income (w) and fee-for-service
income (where p the consultation fee).16 The GPs cost per patient consultation is assumed to
be constant and equal to c. In order to make sure that the GPs participation constraint is
satised for all  2 [0; 1], we assume that c < p. In addition to net income, we also assume
that each GP has semi-altruistic preferences and therefore cares, to some extent, about patient
utility. The aggregate utility of patients attending GP i at time t is given by
Vi (t) = 
Z x(t)
0

1
2
  (1  ) bsi (t)  z dz + (1  )
2
Z 1
0

1
2
  (1  ) bsi (t)  z dz: (9)
The payo¤ of GP i at time t is then assumed to be given by

i (t) = i (t) + Vi (t)  k
2
(   bsi (t))2 ; (10)
where  measures the degree of altruism towards the patients, and where the last term reects
the GPs disutility of adopting a practice style that deviates from the o¢ cial guidelines.
We consider a dynamic game where the two GPs simultaneously (and independently) choose
their practice styles (i.e., i and j) at each point in (continuous) time over an innite time
horizon. This is a 2-player di¤erential game with practice style as the control variable and
demand as the state variable. For analytical convenience, we choose the open-loop solution as
our game-theoretic solution concept. Here it is assumed that each GP knows the initial state
of the system but cannot observe the other GPs practice style, and thus potential demand, in
subsequent periods. This implies that each GP computes his optimal plan (i.e., a sequence of
practice styles over time) at the beginning of the game and then sticks to it forever. Thus, the
optimal choice depends only on time, time-invariant parameters and initial conditions.17
Dening  as the rate of time preference, the dynamic optimisation problem of GP i is given
16As described in Section 3, the payment scheme for self-employed GPs in Norway is a combination of capitation
and fee-for-service, and there is also a separate (but very low) fee for issuing a sickness certicate. In our
theoretical model, the assumption that all workers fall sick once per period implies that the consultation fee p
can be interpreted as including capitation payment. It is straightforward to extend the model by (i) introducing
a distinction between capitation and fee-for-service payment (by assuming that each worker falls sick only with a
certain probability in each period), and (ii) introducing a separate fee for issuing a sickness certicate. However,
this would only complicate the exposition without qualitatively a¤ecting any of the results, since all these fees
would a¤ect GP incentives in the same way (further details available upon request). Thus, for expositional
purposes, we represent the fee-for-service payment scheme only by a single parameter, namely the consultation
fee p.
17See Brekke et al. (2012) for a similar approach to quality competition more generally.
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by
max
i(t)
Z +1
0

i (t) e
 tdt; (11)
subject to the dynamic constraint18

x (t) =  (bx (t)  x (t)) (12)
and the initial condition
x (0) = x0 > 0: (13)
Let i (t) denote the current-value co-state variable associated with the state equation (12). The
current-value Hamiltonian is then given by19
Hi = i + Vi   k
2
2i + i
 
1
2
+
(1  )  i   j
2
  x
!
: (14)
The optimal solution must satisfy the following three conditions:
@Hi
@i
=
(1  ) ( (1  + 2x) + i)
2
  ki = 0; (15)

i = i  
@Hi
@x
= (+ )i   

((1  ) p  c) + 

1
2
  x  (1  ) bsi ; (16)

x =
@Hi
@i
= 
 
1
2
+
(1  )  i   j
2
  x
!
; (17)
in addition to the transversality condition limt!+1 e ti (t)x (t) = 0. The second-order condi-
tions are satised if the Hamiltonian is concave in its control and state variables, which requires
k >  (1  )2.
Time-di¤erentiation of (15) yields
(1  )



x+

2

i

  k

i = 0: (18)
18Since total demand is xed, both GPs face the same dynamic constraint; i.e., the demand dynamics for GP
i automatically determine the demand for GP j.
19 In order to save space, we henceforth drop the time indicator t.
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Substituting in (18) for

i from (16),

x from (17) and using i from (15), we arrive at

i =
1
4k
0B@ (1  ) ( ( (2 (1  )  1) + 2 ( (2 + )  ( + )))  2 ((1  ) p  c))
+4k ( + )i   2 (1  )2 j   2 (1  ) (3 + 2)x
1CA :
(19)
which, together with (17), describes the dynamics of the equilibrium.20
The symmetric steady-state GP practice style is found by setting

i = 0, i = j and x =
1
2 ,
which yields
 = (1  )  ((1  ) p  c) +  ( ( + ) + )
2k ( + )   (1  )2 ; (20)
where  := 12   (1  )   2 > 0 (by the assumption of full market coverage). In the following,
we restrict attention to the steady-state outcome and ask two related questions: (i) How does
the degree of competition a¤ect GP practice styles? (ii) How does the e¤ect in (i) depend on
the GP payment scheme?
Using the share of patients who choose GP as the measure of competition, the benchmark
case of no competition is given by  = 0. In this case, the steady-state GP practice style is given
by21
=0 =
 (1  )
2k
: (21)
When GPs cannot a¤ect demand through their choice of practice style, there exists only one
incentive for GPs to adopt a practice style that deviates from the o¢ cial guidelines, namely
altruistic concern for patient utility at the intensive margin. A more lenient practice style
( > 0) implies that the expected utility of patients who are allocated to the GP increases,
and a semi-altruistic GP derives some benets from this. These marginal benets are optimally
traded o¤ against the marginal disutility of deviating from the o¢ cial guidelines. Thus, semi-
altruistic GPs will choose a strictly positive value of , whereas purely prot-oriented GPs will
set  = 0. It is worth noting that, in the absence of competition, GP practice styles do not
depend on the payment scheme for GPs.
20 It is straightforward to verify that the second-order condition k > 

(1  )2 is also su¢ cient to ensure
saddle-point stability of the open-loop solution.
21 If  = 0, there is no dynamic competition over time. Each GP will choose the steady-state value of  at t = 0
and stick to it forever.
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The case of free patient choice, which implies competition between the GPs, is characterised
by  = 1. The e¤ect of competition on GP practice styles in the steady state is then given by
 := =1   =0 =  (1  )
2k ((1  ) p  c) + 

 (1  )2 + 2k

2k

2k ( + )   (1  )2
 : (22)
The sign of this expression which is a priori ambiguous depends on the sign of the numerator,
which consists of two terms. The rst and second term capture the e¤ect of competition on,
respectively, the GPsnancial and altruistic incentives for the choice of practice style.
We can isolate the nancial incentives by considering the case of purely prot-oriented GPs
(i.e.,  = 0). In this case, we see that the sign of  depends crucially on the GP payment
scheme. The e¤ect of competition on the GPspropensity to issue sickness certicates is negative
( < 0) under xed-salary contracts ( = 1) and positive ( > 0) under fee-for-service
contracts ( = 0). More generally, competition leads to a more lenient GP practice style if
the nancial incentives for attracting more patients are su¢ ciently high-powered (i.e., if  is
su¢ ciently low). If these incentives do not exist, which is the case under xed-salary contracts,
a purely prot-oriented GP will choose a practice style in the steady state that is stricter than the
o¢ cial guidelines (i.e.,  < 0) in an attempt to reduce demand and thereby save consultation
costs.22
The e¤ect of GP altruism is captured by the second term in the numerator of (22) and
contributes unambiguously positive. The reason is that competition allows for patient utility
e¤ects of GP practice styles at the extensive margin. By adopting a more lenient practice style,
a GP can attract more patients and thereby increase the total utility of the patients treated.
Under fee-for-service payment ( = 0), this e¤ect will reinforce the positive relationship between
competition and the propensity to issue sickness certicates. Under xed-salary contracts ( =
1), GP altruism introduces a counteracting e¤ect. If the altruistic gain of increased patient
utility at the extensive margin is higher than the marginal consultation cost, competition leads
to a more lenient GP practice style ( > 0) also for GPs on xed-salary contracts.
22Since total demand is xed, each GP always has the same demand in the symmetric steady-state equilibrium,
regardless of the competitive environment. However, when patients are free to choose their preferred GP, each
GP has a unilateral incentive to increase (decrease) demand if the marginal net benet of doing so is positive
(negative).
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Finally, notice that the magnitude of the competition e¤ect on GP practice styles depends on
the size of the potential demand response to a more lenient practice style (measured by (1  ))
and by how fast actual demand adjusts to such a change in practice style (measured by ).
The above described results are summarised as follows:
Proposition 1 (i) Under fee-for-service contracts, competition always leads to a more lenient
GP practice style. (ii) Under xed-salary contracts, competition leads to a more lenient (stricter)
GP practice style if the degree of altruism is su¢ ciently strong (weak). (iii) When facing com-
petition, a GP on fee-for-service contract is always more lenient than a GP on xed-salary
contract.
5 Data and descriptive statistics
Data on GPs and their patients are derived from the Norwegian Health Economics Administra-
tion (HELFO), which is responsible for the Norwegian primary care patient list scheme.23 For
each patient contact (consultation), whether at the GPs regular o¢ ce or at an emergency centre,
the GP sends an invoice to HELFO. The register includes information on patientsage and gen-
der, date and time of contact, diagnosis according to the ICPC-2-diagnosis code and codes from
a detailed tari¤ scheme for type of contact (including a tari¤ for issuing sickness certicates).
The register incudes the same type of information regardless of where the consultation takes
place (at the GPs own practice or in an emergency centre). HELFO also holds a register of the
regular GPs, including their age, gender, medical specialist status and the personal identiers
of the patients on the list. From HELFO we have obtained data from 2006-2014.
Data from HELFO do not include information on individual characteristics like education
and income. This information is derived from the FD-Trygd database, which links administrative
information from the National Insurance Administration, Statistics Norway and the Directorate
of Labour. The database covers all Norwegians from 1992 onwards. Besides detailed information
on work activity, income and social security (sick leave, disability, retirement pension, etc.), the
database also includes extensive background information such as education, marital status and
number of children.
23HELFO is a subordinate institution directly linked to the Norwegian Directorate of Health.
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5.1 Sample
We restrict attention to the 10 most frequent diagnoses among employed patients attending
PCECs in the period 2007-2014. These are listed in Table 1, which also contains information
on the total number of visits at emergency centres per diagnosis.
[Table 1 here]
From HELFO we have extracted information on all consultations, whether at a regular GP
practice or at an emergency centre, where the patient was diagnosed with one of these 10 di-
agnoses. This amounts to a total of 5,887,319 visits over the period 2007-2014. Since we focus
on GPssick-listing practice we only include patients who were employed at the time of con-
sultation, which reduces the total number of visits by approximately 25 percent. Furthermore,
we exclude from the sample visits to physicians not registered as a regular GP24 and visits to
another regular GP than the one the patient is listed with.25 These two categories constitute
roughly 25 and 30 percent, respectively, of all visits.26 A potential remaining problem is related
to visits which result in emergency hospital admissions. In these cases, the sickness certicate
might be issued at the hospital. In order to exclude such cases we link our data on primary care
visits to data from the Norwegian Patient Register (NPR), which contains (weekly) information
on all admissions to secondary care in Norway. Based on this information, we have excluded
visits from patients who are registered with a hospital stay in the same week as the primary
care consultation.
[Table 2 here]
We also exclude consultations at PCECs that take place during the night (which constitute
less than 3 percent of all consultations). This exclusion is an attempt to reduce unobservable
patient and GP heterogeneity across consultation types. On the patient side, consultations at
emergency centres during the night is likely to involve more high-severity patients, while on
24These include locums, interns, junior doctors from hospitals working in emergency centres, etc.
25A patient might be seen by another GP than the one she is listed with if the patients regular GP is unavailable
for some reason. This is particularly frequent in GP group practices.
26Notice that these two categories are not mutually exclusive. The intersection consists of all consultations
outside emergency centres where the pasient visits a GP di¤erent from the one she is listed with, and this GP is
not registered as a regular GP.
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the GP side, excluding night-time consultations will exclude most of the PCEC consultations
where GPs are paid a xed salary, ensuring a more homogeneous remuneration scheme (fee-
for-service) for the remaining PCEC consultations in the sample.27 Finally, we have dropped
a small number of patients with missing observations on some explanatory variables. Table 2
contains information on the relative size of each of the excluded consultation categories for each
of the ten diagnoses considered.28 Our nal sample contains almost 2.5 million consultations.
5.2 Variables
In line with our empirical strategy (to be further explained in the next section), we classify
all consultations in our nal sample into three di¤erent categories: (i) consultations where the
patient visits her own regular GP and this GP is self-employed and paid by capitation and
fee-for-service, (ii) consultations where the patient visits her own regular GP and this GP is
employed on a xed-salary contract, and (iii) consultations which takes place at a municipal
emergency centre. These categories constitute approximately 85%, 4% and 11%, respectively,
of the total number of consultations. For each consultation we also know whether a sickness
certicate has been issued and whether the consultation is a prolonged one.29
[Figures 1a and 1b here]
Figure 1a shows the frequency of each diagnosis in each category of primary care consul-
tations. For many diagnoses, their frequency is quite similar across consultation categories.
Within this set of diagnoses, we see that upper respiratory infection is the most common di-
agnosis at GP o¢ ces and almost equally frequent at emergency centres. On the other hand,
laceration/cut is much more common at emergency centres. These patient sample di¤erences
will be taken care of in the empirical analysis where we control for diagnosis. Notice, however,
that the descriptive statistics on the rate of sick listing across the three categories of consulta-
tions, as depicted in Figure 1b, show a very consistent pattern. For every single diagnosis, the
27 It should be noted that, according to our theory model, the renumeration scheme has no impact on GP
behaviour in a situation with exogenous demand, as is the case for emergency centre consultations. We have also
estimated our empirical models on a sample where we include night-time PCEC consultations and the results
(which are available upon request) are practically identical.
28Notice that, since these categories are not mutually exclusive, the number of visits in the nal sample cannot
be directly calculated from the total number of visits by using the shares of excluded visits given in Table 2.
29The standard time for a consultation is 20 minutes, but the consultation can be prolonged by the physician.
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sick-listing rate is highest in consultations with a regular GP on fee-for-service payment and
lowest in consultations at emergency centres.
We also include a relatively large set of GP and patient characteristics as control variables.
All variables are listed and dened in Table A.1 in the Appendix. In Table 3 we report the mean
values of all variables (summed over all diagnoses) for each of the three consultation categories.
Patients at the emergency center had a lower number of visits to a GP or an emergency centre
the previous year, but they are also somewhat younger than the average patient at the GP
o¢ ce. For most of the other variables, the descriptive statistics show relatively small and non-
systematic di¤erences across consultation categories. As expected, since regular GPs above the
age of 60 are automatically exempted from the obligation to work at emergency centres, the
average GP age is somewhat lower for consultations taking place there.
[Table 3 here]
6 Empirical strategy
The (twofold) aim of our empirical analysis is (i) to estimate the causal relationship between
the degree of competition a GP is exposed to and his propensity to issue sickness certicates
to his patients, and (ii) to assess how this relationship depends on the GP payment scheme
(xed salary versus fee-for-service). Our theoretical analysis predicts that more competition will
lead to a higher sick-listing rate if GP payment is based on fee-for-service, whereas the e¤ect of
competition on the sick-listing rate of xed-salary GPs is a priori ambiguous and, if positive,
smaller than the e¤ect on the sick-listing rate of fee-for-service GPs.
The key challenge for empirical identication is to create an exogenous measure of competi-
tion intensity. Our strategy here is to exploit the fact that the consultation-specic matching of
patients to physicians is based on patient choice at regular GP practices, whereas it is completely
random at emergency centres. This di¤erence in matching technologyhas clear implications for
the nature of the competitive environment the GPs nd themselves in when they work in their
own practice or in an emergency centre. When patient-physician matching is random, as is the
case in an emergency centre, the GP cannot inuence his future demand, which is exogenous.
This implies that the GP is not exposed to any competition for patients and is equivalent to
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the case of  = 0 in the theory model. On the other hand, when working in his own practice,
where physician-patient matching is a result of patient choice, the GP should realise that his
treatment decisions (or practice style) will a¤ect both the probability that the patient chooses
to remain on the GPs list in the future, and also, through reputation e¤ects, the probability
that new patients will choose to be listed with the GP. This implies that the GP is exposed to
competition for patients and is equivalent to the case of  = 1 in the theory model. Since the
data allows us to observe the same GP in di¤erent competitive environments, being exposed (in
own practice) or not (in emergency centre) to competition, we are in principle able to isolate
the e¤ect on competition on GP behaviour in a way that allows us to make causal inferences.
In order to estimate the e¤ect of competition on physician behaviour, we employ the following
high-dimensional xed e¤ect model where we control for all time-invariant characteristics of
patients and physicians using the Stata module reghdfe (Correia, 2014):
yijt =   Typeijt +  Xijt +  i + j + !t + "ijt; (23)
where the dependent variable yijt is equal to 1 if GP j issues a sickness certicate to patient i
at time t, and equal to zero otherwise. According to (23), we have the following distinct sources
of variation in the dependent variable:
1. Type of consultation (Typeijt) according to the three previously dened categories.
2. Observed time-varying exogenous characteristics of patients and physicians (Xijt).
3. Time-invariant patient heterogeneity ( i).
4. Time-invariant physician heterogeneity (j).
5. Period-specic e¤ects (dummy variables for year, month, day of week and hour) common
to all patients and physicians (!t).
6. Unexplained random variation ("ijt).
Our explanatory variable of main interest is type of consultation. In the analysis we use
visits to emergency centres as the baseline category, which implies that the estimated parameter
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vector  measures the e¤ect of exposure to competition on physicianspropensity to issue sick-
ness certicates, with separate parameter estimates depending on whether physicians have xed
salaries or fee-for-service payments in the environment where they are exposed to competition.
GPs working at emergency centres may well di¤er systematically from GPs who do not on un-
observable characteristics. However, GP xed e¤ects capture di¤erences between GPs regarding
their motivation for working at emergency centers, their attitudes towards the gatekeeper role
and to the usefulness of sickness absence in a therapeutic context, their degree of altruism, and
so on. Patient xed e¤ects, in turn, capture factors such as genetic predispositions, initial health
status including chronic disease, attitudes towards illness and work, and degree of risk aversion
regarding change of Regular GP.
A remaining potential estimation problem, though, is that patients visiting an emergency
centre might di¤er from patients visiting a regular GP. Even in a regression model where we
include patient, GP and time xed e¤ects, and where we also control for a large set of time-
varying patient and physician characteristics, the dependent variable is likely to be correlated
with the error term due to unobserved patient characteristics. However, the interpretation of
the estimation results is greatly enhanced by the fact that, although it is hard to know the
size of the patient selection bias, the direction of the bias appears to be clear. Controlled for
observable patient characteristics, there is no reason to believe that regular GP consultations
involve sicker patient, on average, than consultations at emergency centres. On the contrary,
any potential remaining di¤erence in the average severity levels between the two consultation
types must surely be caused by sicker patients being treated at emergency centres. Although
we cannot directly observe patient severity, this conjecture is backed by the observation that,
for every diagnosis considered, the share of patients who are sent to hospital after a primary
care consultation is considerably higher for emergency centre consultations than for regular GP
consultations.30 We will get back to this issue when discussing our empirical results in the next
section.
Eq. (23) is our preferred model, but we also report results from estimations of OLS models
with time-xed and diagnoses-xed e¤ects, as well as models adding GP or patient xed e¤ects.
30These gures are calculated using the data and procedure previously described in Section 5 and are reported
in Table A.2. in the Appendix.
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When estimating GP and/or patient xed e¤ects specications, we follow Correia (2015) and
drop singleton observations (i.e., GPs or patients for whom there is only one observation) in order
to ensure proper inference and improve computational e¢ ciency in our xed-e¤ect regressions.
7 Results and discussion
Our main regression results are presented in Table 4, which displays results from the estimation
of four di¤erent versions of (23). As a benchmark for comparison, estimates based on pooled
ordinary least squares (OLS) are reported in Column 1 of Table 4. If we compare OLS results
with raw data sickness certication rates (Table 3), the di¤erences in sick-listing propensity
across consultation categories are much less when we control for observable GP and patient
characteristics as well as time xed e¤ects. In particular, controlling for diagnosis is important,
as could be expected from the descriptive statistics (Figures 1a and 1b).
Columns 2 and 3 in Table 4 show the estimates from models with physician xed e¤ects and
patient xed e¤ects, respectively. In the model with physician xed e¤ects, identication of the
competition e¤ect is based on observations of the same physician both in his own practice and at
an emergency centre. On the other hand, in the model with patient xed e¤ects, identication
is based on observations of the same patient visiting her regular GP and visiting an emergency
centre. Finally, in Column 4 we report estimates from our preferred empirical model with
two-way (physician and patient) xed e¤ects, as specied in (23).
[Table 4 here]
For our independent variables of interest, the point estimates are qualitatively similar in all
four models. When a physician works in a more competitive environment (i.e., in his own practice
instead of at an emergency centre), the physicians propensity to issue sickness certicates is
signicantly higher. Furthermore, this e¤ect is signicantly stronger if the physician has nancial
incentives to compete for patients (i.e., if the physicians income in his own practice is based on
capitation and fee-for-service rather than a xed salary). These e¤ects are estimated with a great
deal of precision. In our most preferred model, exposure to competition increases the probability
of sick listing by more than 8 percentage points if the GP is on a xed-salary contract, and by
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more than 11 percentage points if the GP is on a fee-for-service contract.31 The estimated
coe¢ cients for the other covariates are all relatively small in magnitude.
The estimated e¤ect of competition on the sick-listing practice of fee-for-service GPs, who
have nancial incentives to attract patients, serves as a strong conrmation of the prediction
from our theoretical model. That the e¤ect is stronger for these GPs than for xed-salary GPs
is also in accordance with the theoretical analysis. However, our theory predicts that the sign
of the competition e¤ect is a priori ambiguous for xed-salary GPs, with a positive (negative)
e¤ect if the degree of altruism is su¢ ciently strong (weak). The empirical nding of a relatively
strong and positive e¤ect also for this group of GPs suggests, in light of the theory, that the
degree of GP altruism is relatively high.
The results for the two types of GPs might also be partly explained by a selection e¤ect
that is not fully accounted for in our empirical models. When the Regular General Practitioner
Scheme was introduced in 2001, the GPs who were already on a xed-salary contract were given
the right to keep their position as employed GPs earning a xed salary. Thus, the type of GP
(fee-for-service vs. xed salary) is to some extent a result of the GPsown choice and we cannot
rule out the possibility that the two types of GPs di¤er along some unobservable dimension.
One possible self-selection criterion, which seems intuitively plausible, is that the more prot-
oriented GPs opted for a self-employment contract (capitation and fee-for-service) whereas the
more altruistic ones opted to remain on a xed-salary contract. Such a selection e¤ect, which
implies that xed-salary GPs are, on average, more altruistic than fee-for-service GPs, might
explain why we nd relatively strong and positive e¤ects of competition also for the xed-salary
GPs.
There are also two other potential biases that might a¤ect our results. First, as mentioned in
Section 6, our results might be inuenced by patient selection bias due to unobserved systematic
di¤erences between patients who visit an emergency centre and patients who visit their regular
GP. However, as previously argued, such a bias  if it still remains after controlling for both
time-varying and time-invariant heterogeneity must surely be in the direction of sicker patients
attending emergency centres, which implies that, absent the competition e¤ect, the rate of sick
31Using an F-test, we conrm that the e¤ects of competition on physicianssick-listing practice are siginicantly
di¤erent (in all four models) for the two types of GPs (xed salary vs. fee-for-service).
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listing should be higher at emergency centres than at regular GP practices. The fact that we
nd signicantly lower sick-listing rates at emergency centres suggests that we are, if anything,
underestimating the positive e¤ect of competition on physicianspropensity to issue sickness
certicates. Thus, in light of this potential patient selection bias, the point estimates reported
in Table 4 could be seen as lower-bound estimates of the true e¤ect of competition.
Second, another di¤erence between consultations at emergency centres and consultations
at regular GPs, which might potentially a¤ect our results, is that the degree of familiarity
between physician and patient is (at least on average) higher in a regular GP consultation. This
might have two di¤erent e¤ects on the physicians decision of whether or not to issue a sickness
certicate. First, higher familiarity is likely to improve diagnosis accuracy; i.e., the better the
GP knows the patient, the more likely he is to observe the true severity level of the patient.
However, there is no particular reason to believe that this will create a bias in our analysis.
For any given GP practice style (i.e., sick-listing threshold), the inability to diagnose accurately
can create two types of mistakes: the GP issues sickness certicates to patients who should not
have been sick listed, and patients who should have been sick listed does not obtain a sickness
certicate. Improved diagnosis accuracy will reduce both types of mistakes and there is no a
priori reason to believe that the net e¤ect is systematically di¤erent from zero. However, higher
familiarity between physician and patient might also make the physician more prone to give
the patient a sickness certicate in borderline cases. A GP might simply nd it more di¢ cult
to deny a patient he knows well a sickness certicate. In the context of our theoretical model,
this e¤ect could be interpreted as the GP acting more altruistic towards patients when there is
higher familiarity between physician and patient, as would be the case in the context of patient
choice ( = 1).
All else equal, the familiarity e¤ectmight create a bias in the direction of lower sick-listing
rates at emergency centres, counteracting the aforementioned patient selection bias. Notice,
however, that the potential bias due to familiarity between physician and patient is in principle
the same for both types of GPs (xed salary and fee-for-service). The fact that we nd a
signicantly stronger response to competition for fee-for-service GPs than for xed-salary GPs
suggests, in light of our theoretical model, that our results cannot be fully explained by such a
bias. In the next section we will also report results from a sensitivity analysis where we specify
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our empirical model in a way that eliminates the familiarity bias.
8 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we perform some sensitivity tests to our main results presented in the previous
section. The results are presented in Table 5, where Columns 1-4 show point estimates from
the two-way xed e¤ects model with di¤erent sample selection criteria and Column 5 shows
the estimated e¤ects of competition in a di¤erently specied model, with a xed e¤ect for each
physician-patient pair. For space-saving purposes, we only report the estimated coe¢ cients for
our two independent variables of interest.
We introduce (separately) four di¤erent sample selection criteria. First, we exclude all con-
sultations outside the regular GPsopening hours. It might seem likely that patients who attend
emergency centres outside the opening hours of their regular GPs do so because they are too
sick to wait until they can see their regular GP the following day. On the other hand, at least
a share of the patients who visit an emergency centre during the opening hours of their regular
GPs have probably chosen the emergency centre after rst contacting their GP and being told
that he was not available within a reasonable amount of time. Thus, by excluding not only
night-time consultations (as we do in the main sample), but also all other consultations outside
regular GP opening hours, we might further reduce the potential patient selection bias. The
point estimates from regressions on this restricted sample are reported in Column 1 in Table 5
and are very similar to the ones estimated using the full sample.
Second, we exclude consultations with patients living in the municipality of Oslo. The reason
is that, compared with the remaining Norwegian municipalities, the provision of emergency
health care services is organised di¤erently in Oslo, with a larger share of physicians working
exclusively at emergency centres. However, the estimates reported in the Column 2 of Table
5 reveals that this has practically no impact on the estimated e¤ects of competition on GP
sick-listing rates.
Third, we also exclude patients who were already on sick leave when visiting a physician
(either the regular GP or at an emergency centre). Since sickness certicates are issued with a
certain time limit, which can often be quite restricted, a certain share of the total patient mass,
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in particular those with a more long-term disease, might visit a GP simply to have their sickness
certicate renewed. Given that, for a given sickness episode, the probability of having a sickness
certicate renewed is, on average, higher than the probability of obtaining the rst sickness
certicate, and given that renewals of sickness certicates mainly take place at a regular GP
practice, this could create a bias in the direction of higher sick listing by regular GPs, implying
that our competition e¤ects might be overestimated. The point estimates shown in Column 3
of Table 5 suggest that such an e¤ect might be present. By excluding consultations involving
patients who were already on sick leave, the estimated coe¢ cients are somewhat reduced in mag-
nitude. Still, though, the e¤ects of exposure to competition are relatively large, very precisely
estimated, and signicantly larger for fee-for-service GPs than for xed-salary GPs.
Fourth, we exclude consultations where the same patient visits a regular GP within three
days of visiting an emergency centre. This is done to avoid potential cases where a physician at
an emergency centre asks the patient to visit her regular GP in order to get a sickness certicate.
Such cases might potentially arise if the sickness certication decision is a borderline one, where
the emergency centre physician is more comfortable leaving this decision to the patients own
GP.32 However, as shown in Column 4, imposing this sample restriction has only a negligible
e¤ect on the estimated coe¢ cients.
[Table 5 here]
As discussed in the previous section, our results might be biased due to higher familiarity
between physician and patient in regular GP consultations. One way to eliminate this bias is to
estimate a di¤erent version of (23), where we include, instead of separate GP and patient xed-
e¤ects, a xed e¤ect for each physician-patient pair; a match xed e¤ect. In this version of the
model, identication is based on observations of the same physician with the same patient in both
competitive environments. The results, reported in Column 5 of Table 5, show that the e¤ects of
competition are qualitatively the same, although considerably smaller in magnitude.33 Notice,
however, that this way of removing the familiarity biasintroduces another potential bias. A
32Given the acute nature of the diagnoses considered, a window of three days should be enough to exclude such
cases, if they exist.
33While the e¤ect is still highly statistically signicant for GPs on fee-for-service contracts, the relatively
small number of observations where xed-salary GPs see the same patients both in their own practice and at
an emergency centre implies that the e¤ect of competition on the sick-listing rates of these types of GPs is less
precisely estimated.
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physician might reasonably expect that his behaviour towards one of his own listed patients will
a¤ect his GP practice demand, even if the consultation takes place at an emergency centre. Thus,
although physicians face completely exogenous demand when working at emergency centres, it
might be reasonable to assume that, if they happen to see their own listed patients at the
emergency centre, they will behave di¤erently towards these patients. But this potential bias
works in the same direction as the patient selection bias, which is potentially present also in
this alternative model. The fact that we still obtain a signicantly positive e¤ect of competition
on sick-listing rates (for fee-for-service GPs) suggests that the familiarity bias, if it exists, is
smaller than the patient selection bias, and that the true e¤ects of competition are considerably
larger in magnitude then the estimates presented in the last column of Table 5.
Finally, we have also estimated (23) separately for each of the ten diagnoses given in Table
1. The results, reported in Table A.3 in the Appendix, show that the e¤ect of competition
on sick-listing rates is signicantly positive for most of the diagnoses, particularly for GPs on
fee-for-service contracts, although the results across diagnoses are not perfectly consistent. But
this is fairly expected, given the considerably reduced number of observations on which each
estimation is based.
9 Concluding remarks
In this paper we study the impact of competition among physicians on their service provision,
and how this relationship depends on nancial incentives. Despite the fact that almost every
country has a market-based allocation of physician services, compelling empirical evidence on
the e¤ects of competition is sparse. A key challenge is to obtain exogenous variation in the degree
of competition in physician markets. In this paper we address this challenge by exploiting the
fact that many GPs, in addition to their regular practice, work in primary care emergency
centres. This allows us to observe the same GP in two di¤erent competitive environments: (i)
with competition (regular practice) and (ii) without competition (emergency centre). Thus, our
empirical strategy is to exploit within-GP variation in the degree of competition, using the GPs
service provision at the emergency centre as a benchmark to identify the e¤ect of competition.
From rich administrative data with detailed patient level information in Norway over nine
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years (2006 to 2016), we select a sample of the ten most frequent acute diagnoses treated by
GPs. As outcome variable we use the GPspropensity to certify (paid) sick leave to patients,
which is a highly frequent and standardised treatmentfor acute diagnoses. Our main empirical
nding is that GPs are more likely to issue sickness certicates to patients that visit them at
their regular practice than at the emergency centre. The strength of this e¤ect depends on the
GPsnancial incentives. GPs that have a volume-based (i.e., combination of fee-for-service and
capitation) contract are 11 percentage points more likely to o¤er a sick leave to their patients
in their regular practice than at the emergency centre. For GPs with xed-salary contracts, the
same gure is 8 percentage points. We therefore conclude that exposing GPs to competition
has a strong, positive impact on their propensity to sick list patients, which is reinforced by
high-powered volume-based nancial incentives. These results accord with the predictions from
a dynamic model of semi-altruistic physicians whose evolution of demand over time depends on
their chosen practice styles (i.e., their leniency towards issuing sickness certicates).
Although our empirical strategy allows us to identify exogenous variation in the degree of
physician competition, a remaining challenge is to control for other factors (than competition)
that may a¤ect the GPsservice provision in the two competitive environments. The detail and
richness of our data allow us to estimate a high-dimensional xed e¤ect model controlling for all
(observed and unobserved) time-invariant patient, GP and diagnosis heterogeneity, in addition
to a wide set of observable patient and GP characteristics. In order to deal with potential
estimation biases stemming from any remaining (time-variant) heterogeneity, we rst establish
the likely direction of the most obvious bias, namely that patient severity is likely to be higher at
emergency centre than at GP practices, all else equal. This suggests that we underestimate the
true e¤ects of competition and therefore serves as a validation of the qualitative nature of our
results. As a further validation, we carefully re-estimate our empirical model varying the sample
selection criteria (and also the model specication) in order to account for any conceivable
remaining biases caused by unobserved heterogeneity. Reassuringly, our main results hold up
well when being exposed to such a falsication exercise.
The welfare e¤ects and thus policy implications of our ndings are not clear-cut. On the one
hand, exposing GPs to (more) competition leads to more sick listing, which results in higher
expenditures for the employer and the social insurance scheme. In addition, sickness absence
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has a direct negative impact on labour market productivity, all else equal. On the other hand,
sick leave improves patients utility by allowing them to not show up at work when ill and in
most cases improving their recovery from illness. This may also have an indirect positive e¤ect
on labour market productivity given that their health condition is improved. While competition
induces the GPs to become more lenient, we cannot say whether they are too lenient from a
social welfare perspective. One could possibly argue that the treatment at emergency centres,
where a GPs sick listing is not distorted by competition, denes a gold standardgiven that
GPs in this case act as perfect gatekeepers, balancing patient utility and societal expenditures.
However, absence of competition may also involve adverse treatment e¤ects, for instance due to
low diagnosing e¤orts by GPs.
The above discussion illustrates a more general insight, namely that non-price competition
can be excessive and lead to overutilisation of resources, from a social welfare perspective, when
the costs of these resources are not fully internalised in the market. In the case of sick listing,
the costs are not (fully) borne by either the physician or the patient. In general, the potential for
competition-driven overutilisation of resources exists for any non-price dimension along which
physicians compete. Our empirical results indicate that the e¤ect of competition on physician
behaviour is of sizeable magnitude. Furthermore, we show that that these e¤ects are signicantly
interlinked with the nancial incentives inherent in di¤erent physician payment schemes. These
results suggest that policies towards competition and patient choice in primary care markets
should be seen in conjuction with the design of the physician payment schemes, and that the
appropriate policy response to adverse competition e¤ects might be to redesign payment schemes
rather than to restrict patient choice.
A complete welfare analysis of the e¤ect of physician competition requires a careful estimation
on the e¤ects on expenditures and patient utility (including health outcomes and labour market
productivity). Unfortunately, our data do not allow for this, so we leave this issue for future
research.
28
Appendix
List of variables
The variables used in the estimation of (23) are listed and dened in Table A.1.
[Table A.1 here]
Share of consultations where patients are hospitalised
Table A.2 shows, for each diagnosis and for each consultation type, the share of consultations
involving patients who are registered with a hospital stay in the same week as the primary care
consultation.
[Table A.2 here]
Regression results per diagnosis
Table A.3 presents the results from separate estimations of (23) for each of the ten diagnoses
listed in Table 1. For space-saving purposes, only the independent variables of interest are
included in the table.
[Table A.3 here]
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Table 1. The ten most frequent diagnoses at municipal emergency centres 2007-2014 (employed 
patients only). 
ICPC-2 Diagosis Number of visits 
A11 Chest pain NOS1 61,255 
D01 Abdominal pain/cramps general  134,012 
L81 Injury musculoskeletal NOS 71,390 
R05 Cough 56,930 
R74  Upper respiratory infection acute 174,812 
R75  Sinusitis acute/chronic 87,081 
R76  Tonsillitis acute 56,763 
R78 Acute bronchitis/bronchiolitis 57,819 
S18 Laceration/cut  153,081 
U71 Cystitis/urinary infection other  182,994 
1 NOS: not otherwise specified 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Visits excluded from the sample (as percentage of all visits to primary care physicians). 
 All visits1  Patient 
not 
working 
Physicia
n not 
regular 
GP 
Patient 
sent to 
hospital2 
Patient 
visiting  
other 
GP3 
Visits 
at night 
(11:00-
08:00) 
Final 
sample 
Chest pain 283,344 32.01 31.91 21.21 21.74 8.50 96,157 
Abdominal pain/cramps  821,894 31.53 25.99 13.77 23.44 5.53 320,653 
Injury musculoskeletal 342,044 22.99 22.39 19.38 22.95 3.23 143,958 
Cough 665,311 26.90 23.83 0.009 34.47 0.96 284,985 
Upper respiratory infection 1,235,964 18.12 25.43 0.008 35.02 1.02 565,675 
Sinusitis acute/chronic 673,543 19.10 21.68 0.007 30.99 0.79 330,268 
Tonsillitis acute 187,603 18.12 28.15 0.035 30.08 1.19 80,850 
Acute bronchitis/bronchiolitis 551,711 26.35 18.76 0.010 28.19 1.12 259,047 
Laceration/cut  314,272 27.31 39.83 0.061 22.54 11.40 93,293 
Cystitis/urinary infection, other  811,633 30.26 29.09 0.019 31.32 2.85 290,761 
All diagnoses 5,887,319 24.98 25.77 0.051 29.57 2.95 2,465,647 
1 Patients enlisted to a GP (99.6 % of the Norwegian population). 2 Emergency admission to hospital the same week as the 
visit to primary care physician. 3 Visit to a GP other than the one the patient is enlisted to. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics per consultation type (all diagnoses) 
 Regular GP  
(fee-for-service) 
Regular GP  
(fixed salary) 
Emergency centre 
Consultation characteristics 
Sickness certificate 0.353 0.264 0.139 
Visits last year 2,487 (2.390) 2.406 (2.404) 2.147 (2.353) 
Prolonged consultation 0.199 0.230 0.190 
Patient characteristics    
Male 0.377 0.362 0.389 
Age 41.564 (12.533) 41.239 (13.062) 38.260 (12.464) 
Low education 0.215 0.220 0.217 
Medium education 0.440 0.463 0.451 
High education 0.345 0.317 0.332 
Labour income 39.688 (24.378) 35.673 (20.462) 38.186 (24.875) 
Married 0.462 0.448 0.416 
Unmarried 0.390 0.423 0.461 
Divorced 0.148 0.130 0.123 
Children 0-5 0.206 0.193 0.246 
Children 6-17 0.219 0.218 0.216 
GP characteristics    
Male 0.695 0.613 0.768 
Age 50.095 (9.770) 44.826 (11.232) 43.404 (9.051) 
Specialist 0.679 0.445 0.489 
2008 0.135 0.137 0.152 
2009 0.130 0.127 0.139 
2010 0.137 0.136 0.141 
2011 0.152 0.152 0.143 
2012 0.155 0.159 0.149 
2013 0.143 0.159 0.138 
2014 0.148 0.131 0.138 
Observations 2,120,323 101,289 244,035 
Patients 950,706 62,057 207,042 
GPs 4,972 1,055 3,740 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Effect of competition on GP sick listing 
 OLS Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect 
  
(1) 
GP 
(2) 
Patient 
(3) 
GP and patient 
        (4) 
Regular GP (fee-for-service) 0.1319*** 0.1384*** 0.1118*** 0.1114*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0040) (0.0044) (0.0041) 
     
Regular GP (fixed salary) 0.0624*** 0.1085*** 0.0798*** 0.0826*** 
 (0.0072) (0.0054) (0.0056) (0.0061) 
     
Prolonged consultation -0.0009 -0.0067*** 0.0035 0.0025 
 (0.0020) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0017) 
     
Visits last year 0.0104*** 0.0092*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
     
Male -0.0142*** -0.0141***   
 (0.0012) (0.0010)   
     
Age -0.0020*** -0.0016***   
 (0.0001) (0.0000)   
     
Medium education -0.0478*** -0.0375***   
 (0.0012) (0.0010)   
     
High education -0.0749*** -0.0708***   
 (0.0014) (0.0012)   
     
Labour income 0.0001** -0.0001* 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
     
Unmarried 0.0158*** 0.0155*** 0.0066 0.0058 
 (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0038) (0.0038) 
     
Divorced 0.0372*** 0.0321*** 0.0151*** 0.0148*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0040) (0.0040) 
     
Children 0-5 -0.0258*** -0.0253*** -0.0282*** -0.0271*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
     
Children 6-17 -0.0061*** -0.0030** -0.0109*** -0.0100*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
     
GP age 0.0001  0.0003***  
 (0.0002)  (0.0001)  
     
GP male -0.0195***  -0.0168***  
 (0.0032)  (0.0022)  
     
GP specialist 0.0068 -0.0028 0.0018 -0.0008 
 (0.0038) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0032) 
     
Observations 2,465,647 2,465,627 1,924,448 1,924,427 
Singleton observations 0 20 541,119 541,220 
Patients 1,092,740 1,092,727 551,541 551,535 
GPs 5,682 5,662 5,655 5,640 
Time fixed effects1 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnoses fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prob > F2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 adjusted 0.119 0.154 0.317 0.322 
R2 within - 0.107 0.067 0.060 
1 Dummy variables for year, month, week and hour. 2 F-test: Reg. GP (fee-for-service) = Reg. GP (fixed salary)   
***, **, *: significant at 0.1, 1 and 5 percent level. 
 
 
Table 5. Effect of competition on GP sick listing: Sensitivity analyses. 
  Excluding 
consultations 
outside GPs’ 
opening hours 
(1) 
Excluding 
patients 
living in 
Oslo 
(2) 
Excluding 
patients 
already on 
sick leave 
(3) 
Excluding 
emergency 
care visits 
with a 
subsequent 
GP visit 
(4) 
Fixed effect 
GP-patient 
match 
(5) 
Regular GP (fee-for-
service) 
 0.0976*** 0.1146*** 0.0872*** 0.1072*** 0.0383*** 
  (0.0060) (0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0086) 
       
Regular GP (fixed salary)  0.0787*** 0.0865*** 0.0600*** 0.0788*** 0.0185 
  (0.0085) (0.0063) (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0105) 
       
Observations  1,721,627 1,638,769 1,684,065 1,911,406 1,610,288 
Dropped singleton 
observations 
 508,212 478,233 543,963 542,351 855,359 
Patients  499,820 472,609 511,441 555,142 466,523 
GPs  5,587 5,115 5,633 5640 5,510 
Time fixed effects1  yes yes yes yes yes 
GP fixed effects  yes yes yes yes no 
Patient fixed effects  yes yes yes yes no 
GP-patient fixed effect  no no no no yes 
Diagnoses fixed effect   yes yes yes yes yes 
Prob > F2  0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 
R2 adjusted  0.323 0.315 0.321 0.322 0.333 
R2 within  0.056 0.058 0.068 0.060 0.053 
1 Dummy variables for year, month, week and hour. 2 F-test: Reg. GP (fee-for-service) = Reg. GP (fixed salary). 
***, **, *: significant at 0.1, 1 and 5 percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.1. Variable definitions 
Consultation characteristics     
Regular GP (fee-for-service) 1 if visit to regular GP on fee-for-service contract 
Regular GP (fixed salary) 1 if visit to regular GP on fixed-salary contract 
Emergency centre  1 if visit at a municipal emergency center 
Sickness certificate 1 if the physician issues a sickness certificate during consultation   
Prolonged consultation  1 if the consultation is prolonged (beyond 20 minutes) 
GP characteristics 
Male 1 if the GP is male 
Age  Age of GP 
Specialist 1 if the GP is specialist in general practice 
Patient characteristics     
Male 1 if the patient is male 
Age Patient’s age 
Low education 1 if compulsory schooling 
Medium education 1 if upper secondary education 
High education 1 if higher education 
Labour income Patient’s labour income (in 10,000 NOK) 
Married 1 if the patient is married 
Unmarried 1 if the patient is unmarried 
Divorced 1 if the patient is divorced/widow/widower 
Children 0-5 1 if the patient has children 0-5 years old 
Children 6-17 1 if the patient has children 6-17 years old 
Visits last year Number of visits to GP or emergency centre last year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.2. Percentage of patients sent to hospital, by type of consultation.  
 Emergency centre Regular GP (fee-for-
service) 
Regular GP (fixed 
salary) 
 All visits  % sent to 
hospital 
All visits  % sent to 
hospital 
All visits  % sent to 
hospital 
Chest pain 82,759 42.7 131,256 9.3 10,370 15.0 
Abdominal pain/cramps  157,568 40.3 446,074 6.1 32,360 8.6 
Injury musculoskeletal 70,410 45.8 181,800 9.9 15,279 14.9 
Cough 60,613 2.2 356,202 0.4 27,159 0.9 
Upper respiratory infection 164,516 1.8 615,969 0.6 39,650 0.7 
Sinusitis acute/chronic 86,683 1.2 361,911 0.5 23,741 0.6 
Tonsillitis acute 47,957 6.2 79,490 2.3 5,716 3.1 
Acute 
bronchitis/bronchiolitis 
64,819 2.4 319,535 0.8 16,924 1.0 
Laceration/cut  156,914 7.1 80,427 4.8 10,328 5.5 
Cystitis/urinary infection, 
other  
193,909 3.3 342,537 1.4 31,303 1.4 
All diagnoses 1,086,148 14.6 2,915,201 2.7 212,830 4.1 
 
 
 
Table A.3. Effect of competition on GP sick listing, by diagnoses. Two-way fixed effect models. 
Diagnoses: A11 D01 L81 R05 R74 
Regular GP (fee-for-service) 0.0751 
(0.0587) 
0.0938*** 
(0.0168) 
0.0641 
(0.0398) 
0.0671** 
(0.0201) 
0.1416*** 
(0.0140) 
Regular GP (fixed salary) 0.0757 
(0.0899) 
0.0670** 
(0.0265) 
0.0639 
(0.0556) 
0.0706* 
(0.0315) 
0.1189*** 
(0.0216) 
Observations 42,914 200,211 86,810 134,091 303,594 
Dropped singleton 
observations 
53,243 120,441 57,148 150,894 262,081 
Patients 15,536 66,112 24,875 51,335 110,641 
GPs 3,672 5,113 4,151 4,767 5,014 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prob>F 0.994 0.241 0.996 0.619 0.193 
R2 adjusted 0.403 0.378 0.352 0.317 0.326 
R2 within 0.007 0.008 0.012 0.015 0.025 
Diagnoses: R75 R76 R78 S18 U71 
Regular GP (fee-for-service) 0.0973*** 
(0.0128) 
0.0752 
(0.0448) 
0.0746*** 
(0.0231) 
0.0957*** 
(0.0287) 
0.0437*** 
(0.0061) 
Regular GP (fixed salary) 0.0542* 
(0.0221) 
-0.0142 
(0.1082) 
0.1191*** 
(0.0375) 
0.1231 
(0.0644) 
0.0352*** 
(0.0106) 
Observations 188,849 28,994 138,361 31,157 172,826 
Dropped singleton 
observations 
141,419 51,856 120,686 62,136 117,935 
Patients 64,291 11,876 50,028 11,341 59,085 
GPs 5,004 2,731 4,341 3,350 5,136 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prob> F 0.029 0.398 0.166 0.661 0.383 
R2 adjusted 0.308 0.202 0.303 0.253 0.210 
R2 within 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.016 0.013 
***, **, *: significant at 0.1, 1 and 5 percent level. 
Figures 
 
 
Figure 1a. Frequency of each diagnosis in each consultation category. 
 
Figure 1b. Sickness certification rates for each diagnosis in each consultation category. 
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